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Poaching and the Misappropriation of Information: 
An Increasingly Important Form of Opportunism 
 
 
 
We introduce the concept of poaching, the risk that in any contractual relationship information 
that is transferred between parties for purposes specified in the contract will deliberately be used 
by the receiving party, for purposes outside the contract, to its own econ mic benefit, and to the 
detriment of the party that provided the information.  We argue that this form of transaction risk, 
a component of transactions costs, is increasingly important in our service-ce tered, information-
driven, post-industrial economy.  More specifically, we demonstrate the following: 
 
· This form of risk is increasingly significant as firms form alliances and cooperative 
ventures for speed to market in an internet economy, and as new entrants and smaller 
firms form these alliances to gain access to scarce, traditional resources. 
 
· This form of risk has not previously been studied in the more traditional, neoclassical 
transactions cost economics literature, as the form of asset under consideration is not 
consumed through use and cannot be returned after contract termination, making 
allocation of ownership, the cornerstone of transactions cost and incomplete contracts 
theories, ineffectual. 
 
Moreover, while we address the principal questions of transactions costs economics — how a  
risks be managed to increase the likelihood that economically efficient contracts can actually be 
reached — and use the terminology and philosophy of this discipline, the problem we study and 
the findings we derive are fundamentally different from those that have come before this work. 
 Combining case examples and mathematical modeling, we show and discuss the conditions under 
which shared information creates the potential for poaching, examine the impact a defficacy of 
traditional remedies for cont actual problems, and identify new mechanisms for managing 
poaching risk.  Our analysis suggests the presence of poaching risk can substantially alter the 
predictions of transactions cost economics and other theories of inter-firm relatio ships, and 
warrants greater focus by both researchers and practitioners in the design of contracts for 
information technology procurement and technology-based services. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
We introduce the concept of poaching, the risk that in anycontractual relationship, information 
that is transferred between parties for purposes specified in the contract will deliberately be used 
by the receiving party, for purposes outside the contract, to its own economic benefit, and to the 
detriment of the party that provided the information.  We argue that this form of transaction risk, 
a component of transactions costs, is increasingly important in our service-ce tered, information-
driven, post-industrial economy.  Moreover, we argue that it warrants greate  focus, both from 
researchers examining the assessment of transactional risks and in the design of formal contracts 
governing commercial exchange. 
 
The increased use of contractors for information technology-related business services such as 
consulting, technology infrastructure management, provision of application services, and systems 
development has vastly increased the opportunities for poaching in recent years.  Similarly, the 
increased outsourcing of service activities to third party service firms (e.g., all centers, data 
processors), and increasingly, electronic commerce order fulfillment services, often require 
substantial amounts of private customer data to accomplish their tasks in an efficient and effective 
manner.   In both cases, these data, processes and procedures may have substantial resale value, 
possibly exceeding the value of the contract.  Similar concerns also arise in manufacturing 
settings, with the growth of offshore contract manufacturing facilities and an increasingly 
cooperative approach on research and development between buyers and suppliers.  
 
The situation faced by new internet-based businesses such as Priceline.com is typical of the risks 
created by poaching.  In order to capitalize on their patented “name your own price” approach to 
pricing, they have cooperated with other electronic travel sites to achieve rapid market entry.  A 
necessary by-product of this strategy, which appeared desirable at the time, is that their potential 
competitors are now well informed about aspects of their echnology that goes far beyond what 
was disclosed in the patent.  In some cases these former partners are now direct competitors in 
some segments of their business, a fact which was not foreseen at the time of the contract.  The 
financial risk created by these threats is many times the value of the original contract and in the 
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medium term may threaten the survival of the company if not vigorously and successfully 
defended.  
  
Economic analysis of interfirm relationships has primarily been based on one of three perspectives 
from organizational economics:  transactions cost economics (Coase, 1937;  Klein, Crawford and 
Alchian, 1978;  Williamson, 1975), agency theory (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972;  Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) and incomplete contracts theory (Grossman and Hart, 1986;  Hart and Moore, 
1990).  These perspectives cover a wide range of possible contractual problems that arise from 
asymmetric information, bounded rationality, and irreversible investments.  Information about 
vendor behaviors or external market conditions plays a large role in these theories, with the 
general perspective that more or better information will usually improve contractual performance.  
Perhaps surprisingly, there has been little attention paid the behavior of information as an asset 
(with the exception of Brynjolfsson, 1994 and VanAlstyne, Brynjolfsson and Madnick, 1994), and 
no attention paid to the idea that information assets might be detrimentally used beyond a 
contractual relationship (with the exception of Clemos and Row, 1992 and Clemons, Reddi and 
Row, 1990).  In contrast, the literature on R&D has extensively examined the issue of the sale or 
transfer of intellectual assets, but typically assumes that some form of protection such as a patent 
is in place or tha  potential for expropriation is foreseen and deliberately considered in contracting 
among the parties that might value the asset (see Anton and Yao, 1994, especially fn 3).  The 
R&D and patents literature has also examined ex-ante incentives to invest in creative activity 
given the possibilities of ex-post appropriation.  This literature has not focused on the economic 
inefficiencies that arise from the transfer of existing information as a by-product of a contractual 
exchange. 
 
The paper is an analysis of how the increased use and sharing of information assets in a 
contractual exchange can lead to a set of risks, different from those that have been previously 
considered in work in transactions cost economics, incomplete contracts theory or other theories 
of contracting and governance.  This is emerging an important issue in information systems, as 
almost all systems development and IS outsourcing contracts create these risks (see our examples 
section for several variants).  This is especially important for e-commerce businesses (e.g., 
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Priceline, now in litigation with Microsoft) that must rely on outside service providers for many 
operational functions.  While this cooperation is essential for rapid market entry by firms with few 
assets other than their information and intellectual property, this cooperation itself opens these 
firms up to exploitation as a result of the transfer of information; that is, while this information is 
typically the only asset that these firms can contribute to their cooperative vntures, it is also 
frequently their most valuable asset and their only source of advantage.  The risks we study here 
have also become more prominent over time, as the economy moves increasingly towards service 
industries and towards information-intensive production approaches, and as firms are increasingly 
relying on outside contractors to support critical business processes.  In many cases, a careful 
analysis of the potential for information poaching will lead to a different prediction about the risks 
of contracting and the remedies for these risks in outsourcing.  As importantly, the form of risk 
we study has generally not received significant attention from economists in the past, largely 
because it is associated with assets that cannot be returned and are not consumed during use, a 
form of asset that was simply not relevant in previous industries, and, indeed, did not exist in the 
context of heavy manufacturing. 
 
While we draw heavily on previous work in the theory and practice of contracting, our goal is to 
propose an extension to these theories, utilizing approaches, argument style and principles that are 
common in contract theory and organizational economics.  In particular, although our model is 
different we are indeed addressing a central question:  wh n can the risks of contracting be 
managed, and when do these risks preclude the reaching of social efficient and economically 
efficient wealth-creating contracts? 
  
In Section 2, we survey the existing literature on contracting and identify similarities and 
differences between poaching and other contractual problems.  In Section 3 we formally define 
poaching and utilize case examples to illustrate the conditions under which poaching can occur, 
and by analogy with research in transactions cost economics, the conditions under which 
beneficial contracts may fail to be reached.  In Section 4 we formalize these observations in a 
theoretical model.  In Section 5, we evaluate the efficacy of standard contractual remedies in 
addressing poaching and we identify situations where certain types of remedies designed to 
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address other contractual problems may have unintended and negative consequences when there 
is potential for poaching.  We present a brief conclusion in Section 6. 
 
2.  Previous Literature 
 
2.1. Transactions Cost Economics and Principal Agent Theories 
 
To date, the dominant approach to evaluating interfirm contractual arrangements is the 
transactions cost economics (TCE) approach. TCE addresses fundamental questions in the 
breakdown1 of markets, such as the existence of firms as stable employers or the choice between 
vertical integration and spot contracting. 
 
Traditionally, mainstream work in TCE examines how different governance structures economize 
on the combination of production costs and transactions costs.  Earlier writers on the issue of 
transaction governance (such as Coase, 1937) emphasized the role of frictional costs – the cost of 
locating suppliers, negotiating agreements and writing contracts – as the impediment to 
contracting and a motivation for the existence of firms.  Williamson extended this to focus on 
“transaction risks,” which arise due to bounded rationality and the potenti l for op rtunism.   
Unlike frictional costs, which are direct, most of the costs associated with transaction risks are 
implicit:  the lesser of the cost of opportunism or the required investment to prevent opportunism 
from occurring.  For example, numerous costly mechanisms have been devised to protect parties 
in a contract, such as monitoring, performance measurement, bonding, or dual-s urcing.  At an 
extreme, the opportunism risks are so great that firms forego contracting altogether in favor of 
“uneconomic vertical integration”.   Chandler (1977) provides numerous historical examples of 
users of critical resources, like refrigerated rail cars for hauling meat in the summer, for which the 
dangers of relying on an outside vendor were so great that firms did not use the rental or spot 
market, and instead owned these resources themselves.   
 
                                       
1 We use breakdown in the same sense that Williamson and Coase did – not as collapse of market valuations, but 
in the replacement of market institutions by p tentially less efficient non-market mechanisms. 
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The emphasis of transactions cost analysis has historically been in two areas:  moral hazard 
(principally “shirking” <<use the Clemons and Row reference, 1992>>) and hold-up (also referred 
to as “opportunistic renegotiation” <<again, use the Clemons and Row reference.>>).  Shirking 
represents a classic example of the principal-agent problem (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972;  Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976), where a principal seeks to hire an agent to perform a task.  In cases where 
effort is costly to the agent and the outcome of the effort is difficult to measure, the agent will 
exert less effort than is optimal for the principal, thus increasing his or her own benefit at the 
expense of the principal.  The usual remedies for this problem are monitoring to detect 
underperformance by the agent or incentive contracting where the principal and agent share the 
benefits of effort and thus have better aligned incentives.  In some cases, when the principal 
cannot be satisfied that the agent will perform satisfactorily, or where the uncertainty of 
performance is so great that the agent cannot bear the risk of an incentive contract, the parties 
may fail to reach a contract altogether.  Numerous examples of shirking as a problem exist 
throughout the literature, and the problems caused by shirking have the potential to play a role in 
almost any contractual relationship. 
  
Hold-up represents a renegotiation of the terms of an agreement due to changes in bargaining 
power after a contract is signed.  In the economics literature, the mphasis has been placed on 
hold-up arising from switching costs, which principally arise due to relationship specific 
investment (Williamson, 1975;  Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1988; Tirole, 1988) and post 
contractual small-numbers bargaining (Kleindorfer and Kneips, 1982).  Examples discussed in the 
literature include co-located facilities (site specificity), dedicated sk lls or training (human capital 
specificity), or unusual investments in specialized machinery or services for a particular customer 
(see a discussion in Tirole, 1988, p. 21).  In each case, one party makes an investment which is 
more valuable within an existing relationship than on the open market. The primary remedy for 
hold-up is establish the rules for future trade as clearly as possible, build in mechanisms that adjust 
the contract to account for foreseeable but uncertain future conditions (e.g., commodities prices), 
and when this is not adequate, to forego contracting altogether.   In actual contracts, these efforts 
to reduce hold-up appear as longer-term contracting, “escalator clauses” and other market-based 
repricing schemes, or shared investment in dedicated facilities.  However, even with a well-
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designed contract, hold-up can still occur, as unforeseen changes in external conditions can result 
in unexpected shifts in bargaining power (Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978). 
 
Information and differences in information between parties are viewed as critical in transactions 
cost economics.  However, misappropriation of shared or transferred information has not been 
considered.   For example, lack of complete information about the environment was identified as a 
key reason why transactions often had to be uneconomically internalized in the firm: 
“Thus, it is bounded rationality in relation to the condition of the environment that 
occasions the economic problem.” (Williamson, 1975, p. 22) 
 
Similarly, the asymmetry of information between parties is viewed as chief source of opportunism 
risks.   Citing Arrow (1971), Williamson writes: 
It is generally conceded that if information is asymmetrically distributed between the 
parties to an exchange, then the exchange is subject to hazards.”  (Williamson, 1975, p. 
31.) 
 
Williamson later describes a specific relationship between information asymmetry and 
opportunism: 
“Opportunism here takes the form of selective disclosure or distortion of the data to 
which each party uniquely has access. . .”  (Williamson, 1975, p. 32.) 
 
That is, withholding, not sharing information has been seen as the principal source of risk in 
interfirm relationships. 
 
Information “assets” in the form of procedures, work practices and training h ve also been 
considered a critical source of opportunism risk arising from holdup, principally because of the 
specificity of these types of assets (Williamson, 1975).  However, hold-up arising from 
information that is specific to a relationship is exactly the opposite of the problem we consider in 
the study of poaching, where the primary concern is for information that has value outside a 
relationship.   Another perspective on intellectual capability and knowledge work is provided by 
the literature on the multi-task principal agent problem (e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994), 
which emphasizes the inc ntive problems that arise because information work and information 
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activities cannot be easily monitored or incented.  Agai , the emphasis of prior literature is on 
optimal internal use of private information rather than preventing misuse of shared information.
 
2.2.  Incomplete Contracts nd Property Rights Approaches 
 
More recent and more specialized work byGrossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), 
and others led to the development of what is generally known as “incomplete contra ts th ory.”  
These analyses start with the assumption that contracts are incomplete and seek ways to structure 
the contract such that post-contractual bargaining yields efficient outcomes.  Unlike TCE, where 
the principal concern is that beneficial contracts cannot be written, incomplete contracts places 
emphasis on ensuring appropriate levels of non-contractible investment in a relationship. 
 
The stylized incomplete contracts model is a setting in which one or both parties to a contract 
must make a non-c tractible investment, which creates value for the entire relationship.  Because 
each party must bear the total cost of their private investment, but only receives a share of th  
gains they create (simply because there is only 100% of the relationship value to divide among all 
parties), they will not provide socially optimal levels of effort.  If, however, it is possible to set up 
an ex-post bargaining structure that allows each firm to capture its fair share of the gains after all 
investments are made, incentives to invest can be improved.  These ex-post bargaining positions 
are generally established through the ownership2 of es ential assets.  The threat to remove these 
assets from the relationship creates the bargaining power.  Essentially the solution to 
underinvestment is to create hold-up opportunities to ensure the optimal allocation of bargaining 
power by assuring that even weak parties can bargain effectively for acceptable returns and thus 
make non-contractible investments. 
 
                                       
2 By “ownership” we are referring to the economists definition of residual rights of control (Hart, 1988).  In other 
words, the owner of an asset retains all decisions regarding the use of the asset that are not alr ady specified by law 
or contract.  The most important of these rights is the right to exclude others from using the asset.  Clearly, this 
notion of ownership is problematic for information (except information protected by some form of intellectual 
property law, such as a patent or copyright) since it is virtually impossible to exclude someone from access to 
information they already have. 
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Grossman and Hart (1986) use this approach to analyze the decision on whether GM should own 
their metal stamping supplier or utilize arms-length contracting.  They conclude that it is in the 
best interest of GM to own the stamping plant, otherwise the supplier will underinvest in quality, 
which is anon-contractible investment.  Hart and Moore (1988) focus more specifically on the 
ownership of different combinations of assets within a relationship.  They derive some general 
guidelines for the matching of assets and non-co tractible investments.  For example, they show 
that agents that must make non-contractible investments should own the related assets;  similarly, 
agents that need not make non-contractible investments should own no assets.  At an extreme, if 
only one agent must make a non-contractible investment, they should own all the assets. 
 
The incomplete contracts approach has been extended to the study of information assets by 
Brynjolfsson (1994).  He considers a setting where production within a firm (or among a specified 
set of firms) requires the use of physical and information assets.  He studies the conditions under 
which information assets should be transferred and when ownership of physical assets should 
follow the ownership of information assets.  In general, if an agent must make a non-con ractible 
investment, or has essential information, then welfare is maximized when that agent also owns the 
complementary physical assets.  Alternatively, essential information can be transferred to agents 
that must make non-c tractible investments.  A similar framework was utilized by VanAlstyne, 
Brynjolfsson and Madnick (1994) for analyzing who should own databases, and by Richmond and 
Seidmann (1992) for evaluating outsourcing contracts. As we shall show, this work deals 
principally with aligning incentives to reduce shirking, but the mechanisms used to control this 
risk are ineffective, even counter-productive to control poaching, even in the same outsourcing 
domains addressed in this literature. 
 
While this more recent literature creates the precedent for considering the role of information 
assets, the focus is again on optimizing production in a bargai i g group of limited scope (such as 
a firm or a buyer-supplier pair).  That is, it is primarily concerned with underinvestment and 
holdup.  We consider the very different problem of deliberate misuse of an asset.  These problems 
arise in situations where not all parties are able to simultaneously bargain over the allocation of 
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the information,3 the parties that might value the information are unknown at the time of 
contracting, or contracts that specify the optimal allocation and limits to use of informati n assets 
are not enforceable. 
 
2.3.  Summary and Comparison of Previous Literature
 
Overall, while the importance of various types of information – about the environment, 
performance, capabilities, or intentions of the various parties, or specific information such as 
training that is critical to executing a task – play  a central role in many previous theories of 
contracting, there has been little attention to the potential misuse of information in a contractual 
relationship and virtually no analysis of the risks created by information that is shared or obtained 
as a by-product of a contractual agreement. 
 
3.  A Theory of Poaching 
 
3.1.   Introduction 
 
We define poaching4 as involving three components: 
 
1. The exchange of information between two parties, as a natural byproduct of 
contractual exchange for other goods or services, necessary for the performance of 
contractual obligation. 
2. And the subsequent use of this information by the receiving party, outside the 
purposes for which the information was provided, and for its own benefit or 
economic gain 
                                       
3 For example, one of the relevant parties might be a direct competitor of the firm engaged in supplier ngotiations. 
4 Our review of the economics and management literature revealed only two current uses of the phrase “poaching”.  
The first appears primarily in development economics and refers to the unlawful hunting of endangered species. 
The second reference appears in the labor economics literature and refers to the common practice of hiring staff 
from competing firms.  While this second definition shares some similarity to our analysis, the concern in that 
literature is primarily the transaction costs of replacing the employees and the loss of capabilities rather than the 
transfer of specific intellectual assets.  We therefore believe that our use of the term is both new, distinct and 
unlikely to be confused with references in the prior literature. 
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3. At the expense of, or creating economic damage to, the party that provided the 
information.  
 
For poaching to have substantive economic implications, all three components must be present.  
Clearly, absent iformation transfer (1) there is no issue to consider.  The second condition 
restricts the analysis to information that has value either in reuse or resale, limiting the analysis 
and distinguishing this theory from other theories of the allocation of inform ti  assets which 
consider only parties and activities relating to a current contract.  Finally, without economic 
damage to the contributing party there is no economic concern, since reuse of information (absent 
damage) is always beneficial to society.  
 
It may be helpful to put this in the context of previous mainstream work in contracting.  TCE 
deals with the risk of shirking, or the under-provision of effort (either commitment of labor or of 
capital as factors of production) or of hold-up (the misapproriation of compensation for or 
economic gain from exchange).  Incomplete contracts theory deals with the risk of insufficient 
non-contractible investment (a form of shirking) and the role of property rights in promoting 
optimal investment.  Poaching deals with the misappropriation of information, a factor of 
production that is not consumed by its use, and is difficult or impossible to return.   
 
We believe that this provides a natural extension to existing work in TCE, but one that would not 
have been considered at the time that Williamson and KCA were writing, because it was less 
relevant.  That is, the idea of a factor of production that could be costlessly replicated, reused 
without cost, and yet risky to transfer would have seemed implausible.  Moreover, giv n the 
nature of exchange in the heavily integrated firms of the era, and the nature of goods and services 
exchanged, the risks of information transfer as creating contractual risk would likewise have 
seemed implausible. 
 
Perhaps more importantly, while representing a natural extension to TCE, the use of the concept 
of poaching will on occasion lead to a very different understanding of risk profiles and a more 
complete and more accurate prediction of risks associated with contractual exchange.  We begin 
Poaching and the Misappropriation of Information Page 11 
 
 
 
this discussion by analyzing a series of case examples that describe how poaching can appear and 
consider the remedies that can be taken to avoid these poaching problems.  We then investigate 
standard contractual remedies that have been applied to other types of cont acting problems, and 
evaluate their performance in limiting poaching.  These examples will be treated more formally in 
a model presented in Section 4. 
 
3.2.  Case Examples 
 
Poaching is a relevant concern in a wide variety of settings, including both manufacturing and 
services, and in a variety of activities that can be outsourced.  The case examples below represent 
events and scenarios faced at actual firms, although in some cases th  names are omitted for 
confidentiality: 
 
Example 1 (dual sourcing):  A common practice in the semiconductor industry is a “dual 
sourcing” arrangement, where a company licenses technology to a competitor to enable them to 
produce competing products in retur  for a royalty.  The goal of these arrangements is to allay 
customers’ fears of hold-up by the principal manufacturer and ensure a stable supply of 
compatible products, which promotes greater adoption.  In 1982, Intel Corporation licensed the 
technologies related to the 8086 microprocessor to Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) as part of a 
long-term technology sharing and dual sourcing arrangement.  By 1986, Intel decided that they no 
longer wanted AMD to be the second source, starting with the 80386 microprocessor line.  
However, using the knowledge and technologies they previously obtained and realizing that Intel 
was not going to continue the relationship, AMD reverse engineered Intel’s 80386 
microprocessor and soon had a competing product in the market.5  AMD subs quently developed 
their own competing technologies and has now become a fierce competitor of Intel in 
microprocessors, sometimes beating Intel to market with next generation microprocessor 
technology. 
                                       
5 AMD was retroactively granted rights to the 80386 processor technologies in an arbitration proceeding, later 
upheld by the US Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit (Intel Corporation v. Advanced Micro Devices, No. 92-16899), 
due to Intel’s breach of the original dual sourcing arrangement.  
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Example 2 (technology-based services):  Use of a third-party account administration firm naturally 
requires that an insurance company using this ervice provide all of their company records on 
individual accounts so that the account administrators can process and service accounts.  The 
account administration firm now has the ability to mine the company data to identify the most 
profitable customers, which they can pass on as sales leads to competitors or resell to third-party 
marketing firms.   At a minimum, this could cause a loss of business.  In addition, it could also 
cause substantial reputational damage to the insurance company if their customers discovered that 
their private information, entrusted to the insurer, was being made freely availabl  to other firms 
without their consent. 
 
Example 3 (information technology contracting):  A credit card firm engages a systems 
development consultant o build an extensive database system for correlating private product use 
information with publicly available customer data.  The goal is to identify the predictors of 
profitable customers and to enable rapid design of new financial services products.  After 
constructing the system, the systems consultant has considerable expertise in building data 
warehousing systems in credit cards and has fully tested source code for interfacing credit card 
databases with external data sources.  They are now in a strong position t  underbid their 
competitors for work at other credit card firms by reusing expertise and possibly actual code from 
their previous engagement.  They may have even factored in the value of learning and transferable 
expertise in their orginal bid for the job.  More damaging to their original client, the consulting 
firm can pitch this work to competing credit card companies, and with the expertise acquired 
during their first implementation can enable these firms to successfully implement “cop cat” 
technologies years before they otherwise would have been able to do so.  This accelerated entry 
of competitors and their rapid deployment of similar technologies will shorten the period of 
advantage enjoyed by the original client firm. 
  
Example 4 (business services):  Big Fish (BF), a large domestic travel agent seeking to compete 
with global firms such as American Express, needs to have expertise and presence in adjacent or 
related markets like Canada and the UK, and it needs them immediately.  It lacks the expertise to 
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understand the travel alternatives available in these markets, and it lacks the local presence to 
receive priority allocations (e.g., rooms during Wimbledon tournaments) or preferred pricing from 
local suppliers.  It forms an allice with Little Fish (LF), a specialized player in one of these 
markets.  The local affiliate, Little Fish, is interested in obtaining access to Big Fish’s global 
communications network, software for client support, and negotiations skills and preferred pricing 
from global carriers and international suppliers of travel services.  After two or three years, when 
it has the local expertise it needs, the local market share it needs, and the local off-shore name 
recognition among clients and providers of travel-rela ed services for these clients, Big Fish opens 
its own offices, in the same building as Little Fish, and in direct competition with Little Fish.  It is 
willing to honor the other terms of its agreement with Little Fish, but as LF’s customers are 
deserting it and transferring to BF, this offers little consolation to its former partner.  BF has 
appropriated the expertise and exposure it gained through cooperation, and is now competing 
effectively with LF. 
 
LF soon recognizes that it does not have the resources to survive direct competition with BF in 
the long term.  It contacts a major competitor of Big Fish, and offers to transfer the expertise and 
software that it has received during its period of affiliation with BF, potentially undercutting some 
of BF’s sources of competitive advantage. 
 
Example 5 (consultants).  Here BF6 engages a major strategic consulting house to help it develop 
a strategy and systems infrastructure for offering different prices to different consumers for travel 
services.  This project involves the development of a database infrastructure for customer 
information, the development and validation of a variety of modeling tools to determine 
customers’ willingness to pay, and the design of systems that monitor the marketplace to assess 
the customers’ next best alternatives.  In order to provide strategic consulting services, the firm 
must first learn a great deal about BF’s business and the environment in which it operates, the 
various strategies that BF has considered, and the resources n eded to implement them.  It will 
need to learn a great deal about customer behavior in purchasing travel services, the predictors of 
                                       
6 This event occurred at different firms in the same industry as in example 4.  The same pseudonyms are retained 
to shorten the exposition. 
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customer profitability, and integrating external data sources necessary to drive these predictive 
models.   It then consults for and develops a price discrimination strategy companies in different 
aspects of the travel business, such as Marriott and USAirways, two companies that are not 
competitors but that are critical suppliers to BF. It then consults for and develops a price 
discrimination strategy for other firms that can utilize differential pricing such as CitiBank or 
Prudential Insurance, companies that are neither competitors nor suppliers. 
 
3.3.  Analysis of Examples 
 
In each of these cases we observe the essential ingredients for poaching: information transfer, 
opportunity for reuse of transferred information, and damage to the original contributor of the 
information.  We also observe several of the factors that make poaching more likely: 
 
1) Weak intellectual property protection.  The first example the inability to “return” 
information at the end of a contractual relationship.  The other examples highlight the 
difficulties created by limited or non-existi g protection for expertise or business practices.  
Had suitable intellectual property protection been in place, there would have been legal 
remedies to reduce the potential for poaching. 
 
2) Existence of complementary assets.  In all cases, the firm engaged in poaching has a well 
defined market of firms that had the complementary physical and information assets to 
exploit the information.  In some cases (e.g., Example 1) the contract could only be 
written with a firm that already enjoyed or was able to build complementary facilities.  In 
other cases, there were competitors wi h similar capabilities that could attain parity or 
advantage by using the poached information.  Poaching is less of a threat absent these 
complementary assets.  For example, the firm described in Example 3 breaks most projects 
down into multiple parts and assigns them to different systems development contractors.  
That reduces the possibility that a single contractor will have all the expertise required to 
reconstruct the entire system. 
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3) Bounded Rationality:  Limited observability.  In many cases, even when remedies could 
exist, the actual poaching isdifficult to observe.  In the insurance example, it would be 
difficult to know whether the account administrator was reselling data with any certainty 
unless steps were taken to mitigate this specific risk.  
 
4) Bounded Rationality:  Limited predictability.  Even in cases where the poaching is readily 
observable, it may not have been anticipated and therefore was not prohibited in the 
contract.  For example, in Example 4 it may have been difficult for LittleFish t  realize 
that BigFish would have all the necessary resources to enter into their market after such a 
short period of time.  It might be difficult for the credit card company in Example 3 to 
anticipate all the potential uses for their target marketing technology in other industries or 
the types of firms that might seek to offer credit cards in the future along with their 
existing portfolio of products or services. 
 
Analysis of the social welfare implications of poaching in these examples is somewhat more 
difficult.  Despite being privately detrimental to the provider of the information, most of these 
cases lead to increases in total social welfare, provided that the risk of poaching is not so great 
that firms refuse to engage in trade altogether.  When trade occurs, in almost all cases, ex-post 
social welfare is increased because the replication and reuse of information has virtually no 
incremental cost, but leads to increased market efficiency or decreased production cost for other 
parties. 
 
However, the distribution of value from poaching is somewhat unusual.  While the firm that has 
lost control over a valuable productive information asset as a result of poaching is never better 
off, and almost always strictly worse off, as a result of this poaching, the distribution of benefits 
among the other parties is more complex. 
 
The party that misappropriated and misused the information asset will either use the asset directly 
if it can, sell it to a third party, or enter into an alliance, venture or licensing agreement with a 
third party if this is the preferred way to exploit the asset.  This exploitation of the asset will 
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increase competition with the first party, the information provider, creating gain for end 
users/customers of the goods or services enabled by the original information asset. 
 
When the second party’s gain exceeds the first party’s loss there should be no difficulty in 
envisioning a contract that actually permits the reuse of information.  That is, for financial 
payment from the second party to the first, the second party gains specific rights to reuse the 
information, independently or with specified partners.  When the second party’s gain is less than 
the damage caused to the first party, however, drafting a contract to permit he reuse of 
information should be infeasible;  that is, the payment that the first party would demand would 
exceed the value that the second party would expect to capture. 
 
In general, poaching leads to increased social welfare either by enabling production i  markets 
that were not previously served, by increasing competition, or by lowering production cost.  As a 
result, it is often not the case that efforts undertaken by Firm 1 to restrict poaching are socially 
beneficial.7  
 
3.4.  Comparison to TCE Analysis 
 
In distinguishing the differences that a theory of poaching implies for contractual design and post 
contractual conduct, it is useful to compare the predictions of traditional transactions cost 
economics approaches to the predictions yielded by our theory of poaching.  In almost every 
example, transactions cost or contract theory analyses of these cases would highlight different 
concerns. More importantly, in most cases, analysis of poaching would lead to different 
contractual remedies and in some situations generate contradictory conclusions about the 
suitability of various contractual structures. 
 
In Example 1, transactions cost analysis would highlight the potential for hold-up as one party, 
through relationship specific investment, has developed a d pendence on the other.   The principal 
                                       
7 There is, of course, the classic problem with intellectual property protection that it is necessary ex- nte for the 
optimal production of intellectual property, but typically inefficient ex-post. 
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risk to Intel would be hold-up from having made a commitment to a single alternative source 
during the duration of the relationship.   The traditional TCE remedy would be to have the 
primary supplier contract with several vendors, yet from the perspective of poaching this may be 
the worst possible remedy.  The likelihood of poaching increases at least linearly with the number 
of independent suppliers, simply because there are more opportunities for players independentl  to 
choose to abuse their counterparties; however, the likelihood of poaching will also increase more 
rapidly, as each secondary supplier perceives the possibility that other suppliers will poach and 
experiences competitive pressures to do so as a result or at a minimum, recognizes that it would 
be increasingly difficult to attribute the losses resulting from poaching to a specific supplier when 
the supplier base is large. 
 
In the second example, a primary concern raised by TCE analysis would be the hold-up of the 
client, since switching third party administrators would require substantial time and cost to the 
insurance company.   However, perhaps more severe is the risk of shirking in the customer service 
function, which could cause customer attrition  the insurance company and reduce profitability.  
Given that customer service outcomes could be monitored through satisfaction surveys, measured 
complaint and error rates, or inspection of actual customer service events,8 there is an opportunity 
for incentive contracting.  However, if incentive contracting also comes with a commitment to full 
information sharing between the client and vendor or product problems, customer service 
concerns or other proprietary data, then this can increase the scope of poaching.  Thus, these 
contractual remedies, at best, do nothing to reduce poaching and at worst, may actually increase 
it. 
 
In the third and fifth examples (software development outsourcing), there is often a substantial 
gain from trade resulting from using a pecialized development house for software production.  A 
traditional TCE analysis would suggest that the principal risk to the client comes from vendor 
shirking; given the difficulty of monitoring vendor performance and the difficulty of measuring 
                                       
8 It is not uncommon in customer service call centers to have one hour out of every 40 hours of telephone time for 
each representative monitored by a supervisor or tape recorded, and evaluated against a set of customer service 
guidelines.  Most customer support centers also allow random monitoring of phone calls by supervisors or client 
personnel. 
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output (quality of software is not apparent except over very long time periods), combined with 
the difficulty of writing a complete and detailed contract for future delivery of a product whose 
requirements will not be fully known until some later time, shirking doe  indeed appear to pose 
considerable risks.  Secondarily, to the extent that the client becomes dependent upon the vendor 
for delivery, maintenance, and operation of mission critical software, holdup by the vendor 
becomes a real possibility as well.  In this case, since incentive contracting is limited to coarse 
measures such as time of delivery, the principal remedy for shirking would be for the client to 
work closely with the vendor, transferring expertise and assuring quality of the delivered product.  
However, if as we have claimed, the principal risk is from poaching, then once again this remedy 
may assure that the developed product is of sufficient quality to permit resale and thus may 
actually have the unintended effect of facilitating poaching. 
 
Interestingly, like much of the literature on the “make vs. buy” decision, research on IT 
contracting has placed substantial emphasis on the tradeoff between cost savings and vendor 
shirking as the explanation for uneconomic vertical integration.  An analysis of po ching, 
however, would suggest that a more serious concern should be misuse of information.  In 
addition, this sort of analysis of poaching is different than the usual remedy of “not outsourcing 
strategic systems” (see e.g. Lacity, Willcocks and Feeny, 1996) or never outsourcing “core 
competencies” (Quinn and Hilmer, 1994), since it does not rely on definitions of “core” or 
“strategic”, but identifies an issue that is present whenever transferred information has value from 
reuse or resale. 
 
A traditional TCE analysis of the fourth example would show BF enjoying critical resources 
(integrated information systems, a global network, and a global set of relationships with 
international suppliers) that are not readily available to LF elsewhere; this suggests that LF will 
face a small numbers bargaining situation and if it makes commitments to its clients to deliver 
global services it will be vulnerable to holdup by BF.  In contrast, BF would conclude that LF had 
few critical resources, and that any of several local agencies might provide it with comparable 
service; holdup by LF would not be a threat.  Thus, both BF and LF might conclude that, 
provided that each could monitor the degree of effort made by the other, the principal risk 
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associated with the relationship would stem from LF’s reliance upon BF.  This risk might manifest 
itself as changes in payments between BF and LF, or disputes over distribution of gains resulting 
from their association.  This would be made more complex by the unobservability of som  of 
these gains; how, for example, might each party estimate the increase in revenues earned by the 
other that were directly attributable to their relationship?  Classical approaches to resolve these 
problems might, if profits from the association c uld be measured, result in some form of long 
term incentive contract.  If monitoring were not sufficiently effective, some form of asset transfer 
to LF might be appropriate to help balance long term bargaining power.  However, incentive 
contracting will do little to prevent poaching, and asset transfers to prevent shirking always 
increase the danger of poaching. 
 
4. A Model of Poaching 
 
In this section we present a model of poaching that describes contractual outcomes in scenarios 
similar to those described n the “Case Examples” in Section 3.2.  Our model assumes that 
poaching of an information asset is possible and focuses on the effects of complementary assets 
and competition in determining the profit and social welfare implications of poaching. 
 
4.1 Model Setup 
 
Consider the following production situation.  There are three classes of assets: 
I – An information asset  
P – A production plant, which is indivisible 
D – A distribution system, which represents coverage of a sales territory.  Each firm (i) hasa 
distribution territory (which may be empty or overlap other regions) represented by Di. 
 
These assets are all fixed and, moreover, cannot be acquired through investment over the time 
horizon of this model.  Assets P and D are also non-transferable, while I is transferable and can be 
possessed by multiple firms. 
 
There are three firms: 
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Firm 1 – A “product innovator” who owns D1 and possesses I 
Firm 2 – A “contract manufacturer” who owns P, but initially has no distribution (2D = Æ ) 
Firm 3 – A “fast follower” who has access to a distribution system D3 
 
The unit cost of production (c) is determined by the ownership of physical and information assets 
(the notation we will use is c(A) where A represents a set of assets owned by a coalition of firms).  
We assume that no production is possible without information (I), and that access to the 
production plant (P) makes production more efficient.  Thus, 
  ({ , }) ({ }) ({ })c I P c I c< < Æ = ¥    (1) 
For notational simplicity we define ({ , }) and ({ })p Ic c I P c c I= = . 
 
As stated earlier, distribution systems represent a sales territory.  We describe a sales territory as a 
number of customers (T) in that territory, each with unit demand (one unit or none) and a 
reservation price r  for the good common across all consumers and regions.  Given that there are 
two non-empty distribution regions, there are only three possible sales territories to consider, one 
unique to each distribution system (T1, T3), and one region that overlaps between the two (T13).9 
These territories are distinct in the sense that customers in one territory are assumed to not 
purchase products in another territory. 
 
When more than one firm produces and sells product in a region, we assume they set price 
simultaneously and non-cooperatively.  We model competition in these regions using the well 
known “linear city” model of Hotelling (1929).  We chose this approach because it represents the 
simplest and most tractable model that captures the notion that competition does not nec ssarily 
lead to Bertrand pricing because of firm differentiation.  Following standard assumptions, we 
assume that customers in a territory (T) are uniformly distributed along a line of unit length with 
location x ( [0,1]xÎ ) and face a quadratic “transportation cost” given by 2tx for a firm located at 
the origin and 2(1 )t x-  for a firm located at position 1.  This transportation cost can be thought of 
as a degree of differentiation of the firms, which can arise due to brand, advertising, or other 
factors.  As t increases, the firms are increasingly differentiated and eventually act as monopolies 
                                       
9 D1 corresponds to territories T13 and T1;  D3 corresponds to territories T3 and T13. 
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over the customers in their region.  When t=0, there is no differentiation and Bertrand competition 
will ensue.  To avoid issues of whether the entire market will be served due to these 
transportation costs, we assume that it is always economically beneficial to serve the entire market 
if it is economical to serve anyone [a sufficient condition is 
3
max({ })
2 i
r c> +  where {ci} is the 
set of unit costs for the set of firms selling in that region – see appendix for proof].  Note that in 
our model, no more than two firms compete in any market and since it has been previously shown 
that optimal location of two firms in the linear city model are at the ends of the line (see Tirole, 
1998, p. 280) we need not consider the optimal location problem of these competing firms.  We 
also make the further assumption that firms can only offer a single price and cannot
discriminate by location (x).  In the discussion that follows we let 1 1,
m mp q represent firm 1’s prices 
and quantities in a monopoly setting and 1 1,
d dp q represent prices and quantities in a duopoly 
setting (for duopoly, 3 3,
d dp q  are defined analogously for Firm 3). 
 
Under these competitive assumptions, we can define two prices that will prevail depending on 
whether a territory is served as a monopoly or duopoly.  Since our earlier assumption guarantees 
that any market that is served is served completely, the optimal monopoly price takes full surplus 
from the most distant customer, and this price is maximized when the monopolist locates at 
x=1/2.  Therefore the monopoly price is / 4m r t= - , and the firm receives the entire demand in 
that region 1mq =  (we let q represent the fraction of a territory that is served – total demand is 
Tq where T is the territory size defined above). 
 
For duopoly competition it is easy to show (see Appendix for proof) that for firm i (when 
competing with firm j) prices and quantities are given by: 
 
2 1
 (2) and     (3)
3 2 6
i j i jd d
i i
c c c c
p t q
t
+ -
= + = -    
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That is, they split the market depending on their relative cost advantage.  If unit costs are identical 
( i jc c= ), these equations reduce to 
dp c t= +  and 
1
2
dq =  for both firms.  Note that with our 
assumptions about market coverage above, these solutions guarantee that duopoly prices are 
lower than monopoly prices (d mp p£ ). 
 
Our analysis will involve the comparison of different outcomes depending on the distribution of 
the various assets, especially the information asset which can be redistributed and utilized by firms 
other than Firm 1 by poaching or by contractual agreement.  To determine how surplus is 
distributed when firms bargain with each other, we use the Shapley Value (Shapley, 1953).  The 
Shapley Value for a firm is derived as the difference between the value a coalition receives when 
the firm is present (and thus contributes the use of the assets they own) and the value it receives 
when the firm is absent (thus possibly excluding firms from using their assets).  This is averaged 
over all possible coalitions of firms engaged in bargaining.  The Shapley Value is chosen because 
it yields a non-arbitrary division of surplus, captures the intuitive idea that bargaining power 
should be proportional to marginal creation of value, and is commonly used in incomplete 
contract modeling (see e.g., Hart and Moore, 1990 or  Brynjolfsson, 1994).  In its simplest form 
(two firms, both essential to production) it reduces to the Nash bargaining solution where the two 
firms simply divide the bargaining surplus equally. 
 
We now consider several possible cases that represent different production outcomes in various 
poaching scenarios.  We will use the notation Vi to represent the value contributed to total surplus 
by firm i, and pi represent the total profit captured by firm i (the  share after bargaining). 
 
4.2  Poaching Analysis 
 
As a baseline, we first calculate the profits of Firm 1 when they choose not to contract with Firm 
2 and no third-party (Firm 3) exists.  Firm 1 enjoys a monopoly in all regions where they have 
distribution capability.  The profits are therefore:  1 1 1 13[ ]( )
m IV p c T Tp = = - +  and represents the 
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default outcome.  Firm 1 faces no poaching risk, but similarly produces inefficiently because they 
have no access to the plant so are forced to product at a cost Ic  where I Pc c> . 
 
If poaching were not possible, Firm 1 could contract for Firm 2 for production capacity which 
would lower marginal production cost to P  and total production costs to 1 13( )
Pc T T+ .  As both 
firms are essential to realizing this cost savings, bargaining would evenly divide this surplus 
among the two firms yielding the following profits: 
 
1 1 13
2 1 13
( )( )
2
1
( )( )
2
I P
m
P I
c c
p T T
c c T T
p
p
+
= - +
= - +
        (4a – 4b) 
 
As long as Firm 2 has no access to distribution capability or no resale opportunity, this result will 
prevail and Firm 1 can realize gains from outsourcing.  However, if Firm 2 should obtain access to 
distribution capability, the outcomes will change dramatically.  The simplest story is that Firm 2 
enters into an agreement with Firm 3 to obtain distribution capability and poach the information 
asset (I) from Firm 1, unbeknownst to Firm 1.10  This will have two negative effects on Firm 1.  
First, they will overestimate the potential cost savings for contracting with Firm 2 because they 
believe that they will have a monopoly in the overlapping region, when in fact they will be facing a 
competitor.  This will lead them to misestimate their bargaining position with Firm 2 and overpay 
for access to the plant.11  Second, they face the first order loss in profits from facing a competitor 
in the overlapping region.  The profits for Firm 1 are given by: 
                                       
10 An alternative story is that Firm 2 acquires distribution capability equivalent to Firm 1 during the lifetime of the 
production agreement.  Once intellectual property protection expires, Firm 2 is now a cost advantaged competitor 
to Firm 1 in their home territory.  At a minimum, this will create a shift to duopoly competition.  In the worst case, 
Firm 2 is sufficiently cost advantaged over Firm 1 that they can price Firm 1 out of the market.  This can occur if:  
1
6 2
I Pc c
t
-
³  and Firm 1 has no alternative cost lowering technology or partnership available (this can be derived by 
using the heterogeneous cost equations and finding the cost difference that sets Firm 1’s duopoly demand to zero).  
This corresponds to the situation described in Case Example 1. 
11 There are two additional assumptions that we will use in calculating damages in this and subsequent scenarios.  
First, choice of location is costless and can be made after the firm discovers whether there is a monopoly or 
duopoly in a region.  This is not restrictive, as it just represents a transfer from firm 1 if “moving” is costly and a  
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1 1 13
1 13
[ ] [ ]
1
[ ]( )
2
m P d P d
I P
p c T p c q T W
W c c T T
p = - + - -
= + +
       (5a-5b) 
Where W represents the payment to Firm 2 for access to the plant.  In the bargaining game 
between Firms 2 and 3, both firms are essential – Firm 2 cannot produce without distribution, and 
Firm 3 cannot obtain product without Firm 2.  Therefore, they split the profits earned from 
poaching (and Firm 2 earns their profit from serving Firm 1 as well): 
2 3 13
3 3 13
1 1
( ) ( )
2 2
1 1
( ) ( )
2 2
m P d P d
m P d P d
p c T p c q T W
p c T p c q T
p
p
= - + - +
= - + -
      (6a – 6b) 
 The change in profits by poaching for each firm can be calculated by comparing the profit 
functions for Case 1 and Case 2 (aggregating the profit calculations for firm 2): 
 
3
1 13 134
2 3 13 3 13
3 2
( ) ( )
1 1 1
[ ( ) ( ) ] [ ]
2 2 4 2
m d d p d
m p d p d p
p p q c q T r t T
t
T p c T p c q T r c T t
p
p
p p
D = - - + = - -
D = - + - = - - +
D = D
   (7a – 7c) 
 
Equations 7a-7c can now be used to calculate the optimal outsourcing decision for Firm 1 as well 
as the profit implications of outsourcing when poaching is a risk. 
 
The outsourcing decision for Firm 1 depends on whether the gains from production efficiency 
outweigh the losses either from poaching or the cost of remediation.  Let the fixed cost of 
remediation be represented by R.  These costs represent a fixed investment in contractual 
safeguards – these could include monitoring costs, contractual restrictions on the vendor or the 
client which create opportunity costs, or other losses incurred from implementing the remediation 
strategies described earlier in Sections 3.5 and 3.6.  For remediation to be viable two conditions 
                                                                                                                            
change in the profits in the monopoly case (reduced by t/4).  We also assume that Firm 1 pays per unit produced 
rather than  lump sum for total production in their outsourcing contract for Firm 2.  Again, if this is not true, it 
simply represents a transfer from Firm 1 to Firm 2.
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must be satisfied.  First, remediation cannot be viable if it exceeds the gains from outsourcing 
which implies a condition: 1 13( )( )
I pT T c c R+ - < .  Second, the cost to Firm 1 of remediation must 
be less than the losses from poaching.  Because bargaining between Firm 1 and Firm 2 yields 
equal surplus division, Firm 1 will privately bear half of the remediation cost.  Thus, remediation 
can be beneficial if  13
3
( )
4 2
R
r t T- > .  If these two c nditions both hold, then the firm will 
optimally outsource and invest in remediation.  If either of these conditions do not hold, then the 
firm faces a simple outsource vs. insource decision depending on whether gains from trade (net of 
poaching losses) are positive. Thus a firm will outsource when:  1 13 13
1 3
( )( ) ( )
2 4
I pT T c c r t T+ - < - .   
 
Where the costs of remediation are prohibitive and that the firm chooses to outsource anyway – 
either because they ignore or miscalculate the poaching risk, r t at outsourcing is still profitable 
even with poaching -- it is now straightforward to calculate the change in profit due to poaching.  
This is useful for examining the profit implications of poaching, which in some determine the 
strength of incentives to poach and well as the prospects for viable outsourcing arrangements. 
 
Several observations are apparent from the results in Equation 7a-7c: 
1) The loss from poaching to Firm 1 is:  i) increasing in the size of the overlapping region, ii) 
increasing in customers reservation price, and iii) decreasing in the degree of product 
differentiation (that is 1 0
t
p¶D
£
¶
). 
2) Poaching is only profit-neutral for Firm 1 if there is no overlap in distribution capability 
(T13=0).  In this case poaching is pareto- ptimal because it opens the new market (T3), but 
one could argue that Firm 1 receives less than their “fair” share of the surplus since the 
value of the information used in region T3 accrues entirely to Firms 2 and 3.
3) The profits of Firms 2 and 3 are always weakly improved with poaching.  They are strictly 
improved if market T3 can be served by a monopolist, or if market T13 has profits in the 
duopoly case.  They are increasing in the degree of differentiation between the products 
offered between Firm 1 and Firm 3 as long as region 3 is at substantially larger (at least 
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four times under our assumptions) the size of the overlapping region and strictly 
increasing in the size of the distribution territory served by Firm 3 (which can be 
interpretated as a quantity of assets complementary to the information asset). 
4) Consumer surplus is never decreased by poaching in these examples.  Consumers receive 
weakly lower prices in the overlapping region and the possibility of realizing positive 
surplus in region T3. 
 
These results from our simple model describe very neatly the situations faced in the earlier case 
examples.  In each of the Case Examples 1-4 in Section 3.2, there was a situation where an 
information asset that was provided to a third party for efficiency reasons, could be transferred to 
another firm, whose presence in the market caused damage to the firm that contributed the asset.  
These all correspond to cases where products are substitutable and there is overlap in distribution 
in our model (that is, 13 0T > ).  In some cases, such as the data processor poaching customer 
information (Example 2), the overlapping region is less than the total market but has no market 
expanding effect (T1>0, T13>0, T3=0).  In other cases such as those described in Examples 3 and 
4, the overlapping region was essentially the entire market (T1=0, T13>0, T3=0).  In all these 
examples, Firms 2 and 3 and consumers are better off, while Firm 1 is generally worse off. 
 
In Case Example 5, there are actually multip e scenarios that can be restated in our model 
formulation.  Recall that Case Example 5 described a situation where a travel agent (BF) engages 
a strategic consulting firm to aid in strategy formulation.  This strategy proves to be useful for 
direct competitors, suppliers and firms in unrelated markets.  In the direct competitor case, this is 
an extreme form of the poaching case described where the total market is primarily comprised of 
the overlapping region (13 0,  
d mT p p> <  but also T1 and T3 small).  In this case, the intermediary 
(consultant) gains benefits from the initial engagement with BF, and then recaptures some of BFs 
gains from the relationship by passing the information on to competitors.  The primary winner is 
the firm that engaged in poaching, BF is substantially worse off, and the competitor is slightly 
better off.   
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In the second scenario in Example 5, where information is resold to suppliers (airlines), this is a 
situation where the overlapping region (T13) s on-null, but there is also a substantial outside 
region (T3)-- which is possibly much larger than the region served by Firm 1.  In this case, both 
producer and consumer surplus are increasing overall. Firms 2 and 3 gain at the expense of Firm 
1.  This scenario represents a bargaining opportunity between Firm 1 and Firm 2 to achieve this 
social optimum, although anti-trus  or collusion concerns might limit the chances that such an 
agreement could be reached. 
 
In the final scenario, poaching to benefit non-competitors, this is the ideal situation from Firm 1’s 
standpoint.  There is no overlap in distribution region (T13=0) a d therefore no damage to Firm 1.  
Poaching is socially efficient as Firms 2 and 3 benefit.12  The only concern in this analysis is that 
Firm 1 has not been able to capture the secondary value that their information has brought to the 
market by enabling region T3 to be served.  This could be accommodated by reducing the 
consulting fees paid by Firm 1, or if large enough, by a significant licensing fee split between Firm 
1 and Firm 2.  This, of course, assumes that Firm 1 either anticipated the potential for poaching or 
could detect it after the fact. 
 
4.3 Resolving Poaching Problems through Bargaining 
 
The preceding section assumed that reducing poaching was an all or nothing proposition – F rm 1 
could either invest in detection or insource, but was assumed not to be able to participate in the 
potential social gains from information reuse.  There are several situations where this might be too 
stringent.  First, the firm may be able to make a precontractual investment in identifying 
alternative uses for the information asset.  This information could form the basis of a profit 
sharing agreement between Firm 1 and Firm 2 allowing information reuse.  In some cases, the 
alternative uses may already be known.  Another case is when Firms 1 and 2 engage in a long 
term relational contract where reuse can be negotiat d as opportunities arise.  The presence of 
                                       
12 Note that some interpretations of this situation could violate the third condition in our definition of poaching – 
that for theft of an asset to be poaching it has to create damage to the part that contributed to the asset.  However, 
this is consistent if we view the profits from Firm 2 as belonging to Firm 1. 
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this bargaining opportunity expands the range of the parameter space for which outsourcing is 
viable, and also creates gains in consumer surplus because it opens new markets and increases 
competition in the overlapping market.  As the “owner” of the information asset I, Firm 1 will 
only participate if they can reover their losses, which is also the condition where total change in 
producer surplus is positive.  This occurs when: 
2 3 1p p pD + D ³ -D           (9)   
Substituting solutions found earlier and rearranging this equation yields: 
3
13
(4 4 )
4 7
IT r t c
T r t
- -
³
-
          (10) 
This suggests that a negotiated agreement to allow information reuse is more likely to be possible 
when the demand in the outside monopoly market is large compared to the overlap or products 
are more differentiated (which implies less loss from duopoly pr duction). 
 
However, in many cases it may difficult to reach such an agreement.  First, this type of agreement 
could be perceived as collusive by regulators.  Second, it relies on the ability of Firm 1 to 
preidentify all firms that have potential reuse opportunities.  Thus, we expect that negotiation 
alone will have limited efficacy; we consider alternative approaches in the next section. 
 
5.  Remedies for Poaching 
 
We begin by examining the extent to which common remedies for other transaction risks can 
reduce or prevent poaching.  Then we examine approaches for managing risks that are unique to 
poaching.  
 
5.1 Existing Approaches 
 
There are a wide variety of contractual remedies for addressing various types of information or 
incentive problems that have been identified by other contracting theories.   In this section, we 
systematically examine the efficacy of these approaches for limiting poaching, as well as ny 
negative consequences that could arise when these approaches are employed without considering 
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the potential for poaching.  As we saw repeatedly in the previous section, the general conclusion 
is that most traditional remedies have limited ability to address poaching, and a few can be directly 
counterproductive.  At the end of this section, we identify several new mechanisms that appear to 
resolve some types of poaching issues. 
 
5.1.1 Incentive Contracting and Monitoring 
 
The classic solution to incentive problems is to propose a contract that aligns the interests of the 
client and the vendor.  The general structure is that when effort is not observable directly, the 
client can be compensated on the basis of an ex-post signal of effort (such as output, stock price, 
etc.).  This partial alignment of incentives leads to increased effort by the vendor.  However, the 
more random variance in the signal, the more unnecessary risk that is placed on the agent from 
incentive contracting and thus, less weight can be placed on the signal.  Investments in monitoring 
can improve the precision of the signal, at some expense.  This is the classic tradeoff between 
incentives, risk, and monitoring cost (see Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994).   
 
Incentive contracting is only weakly applicable to preventing poaching because poaching is 
difficult to observe (and thus difficult to disincent).  To the extent that poaching does affect high-
level performance measures of the client or vendor, paying based on profitability or other high-
level performance measures may help somewhat.  However, this is likely to be a very weak 
incentive when compared to the much larger gains or damage created by poaching, unless the 
performance component is very large (the required condition is the same as given by equation 10), 
which is not appropriate for situations where the contract is a small part of overall activity of a 
firm. 
 
Investments in monitoring of poaching activity are a reasonable remedy, although limited by the 
degree of observability of poaching.  Information misuse can often only be observed by the 
capabilities it provides, making it difficult to establish with certainty a direct link between a 
market outcome and the misappropriation of information.  To resolve this uncertainty it may 
require xtensive access to private information on activities and business processes of the firm 
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engaging in poaching, which may be costly and difficult to obtain.  Thus, monitoring may be a 
relatively costly or limited remedy, although extreme circumstances will justify its use.   
 
There is some risk of incentive contracts exacerbating poaching.  The primary difficulty is that 
incentive contracting is often coupled with increased information sharing.  For example, for a 
sales agent to be effective and to direct customers to high profit products to maximize their 
compensation under a profit-based incentive scheme, the sales agent will need to know a great 
deal about the relative profitability of different products.  This information may have substantial 
value to the agent (and create substantial losses to the employer) should the agent begin to work 
for a competitor or should the agent go into the same business as a direct competitor, only 
distributing the profitable products.  This can be modeled generally as an incr ase in the size of 
the outside opportunity (3T increasing) or alternatively the transfer of an additional information 
asset 2I , that has is complementary to marketing capability (and thus has no impact on the value 
created by a coalition of firm 1 and firm 2) but can increase value of the outside opportunity 
(when marketing is conducted by firms which would not normally have 2I ). 
 
As a final note, there is an unusual interaction between poaching and incentive contracting.  When 
a firm can make a non-contractible investment (in the spirit of classic incomplete contracts 
models, e.g. Hart and Moore, 1990) poaching may actually create a situation of over-inves ment 
(rather than the usual problem of under-investment).  For example, if a firm is able to use a 
technology in its primary contract, as well as an outside opportunity that is at least as large as the 
primary contract, the firm will be able to receive more than 100% of the surplus generated to the 
primary contract by their investment.  This is interesting, not because it solves the usual under-
investment problem, but because firms that intend to engage in poaching may be appear to be 
exceeding expectations in their original engagement. 
 
5.1.2.  Transfer of Asset Ownership 
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Asset ownership arises as a common mechanism in incomplete contracts analyses because it 
conveys bargaining power over ex-post surplus and therefore increases incentives for ex-ante non-
contractible investment.  Transferring asset ownership may be problematic as a mechanism to 
reduce poaching for several reasons.  First, ownership of essential assets or transfer of other 
assets from the principal to the agent may result in an additional information transfer.  For 
example, transferring a machine that produces a unique product may provide information on the 
design or the formula for the product itself.  In addition, if assets complementary to a piece of 
poachable information are transferred, the receiving firm now has an increased capability to 
engage in poaching.  Generally, it is optimal to limit asset ownership as much as possible if 
poaching is a concern, and thus transferring assets has, once again, precisely the wrong effect on 
the risk of poaching.  The analysis is similar to the discussion of incentive contracting – if an 
addition physical or information asset is transferred that is complementary to outside use, this will 
increase the scope of poaching. 
 
5.1.3. Restricted activities 
 
The idea of excluding specific activities has been considered in the principal-age t literature.  A 
special class of incentive contracting that arises as a consequence of the multi-task principal agent 
model (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991) is an exclusion restriction, which represents a prohibition 
of effort.  For example, firms often prefer employees to work in the office, even if is not strictly 
necessary, improving incentives to perform work activities by excluding desirable alternative 
activities that would be available if they were permitted to work from home. 
 
While the idea of exclusion restrictions for incentive purposes seems to have little relationship to 
poaching, the general idea of restricting activities is quite important.  Many types of contractual 
mechanisms such as non-disclosure agreements, non-competition clauses and limitations of future 
trade partners can be effective in limiting poaching if the appropriate set of restrictions can be 
identified at the time of contracting.   
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These restrictions have two difficulties.  First, the less observable a parties activities are, the more 
difficult it is to enforce restrictions.  It may often be difficult to determine whether a contractor is 
working for a competitor, or to define in advance the relevant set of competitors and areas of 
activity that must be excluded.  Second, these restrictions create opportunity costs for vendors, 
which will often require compensation. 
 
5.1.4. Bonding 
 
Firms may agree to post a bond to demonstrate willingness or ability to satisfy terms of an 
agreement.  Bonding has two values:  first, it guarantees that some resources will be available to 
compensate the aggrieved party in the case of contractual non-performance, and second, it often 
introduces a third-party arbitrator to oversee whether the termsof th  agreement were met.  In 
general, to the extent that poaching is observable and verifiable by a third party, bonding can be 
effective.  Similarly, there are no potential negative consequences caused by using bonding to 
solve other contractual problems, provided the bonding process does not require additional 
information to be shared.13 
  
5.1.5.  Reputation 
 
Reputation is a form of bonding, where the bond itself is implicit.  A firm builds up a reputation 
over time for engaging in appropriate conduct. This foregone opportunism has a cost to the firm, 
which forms the economic value of their bond (see Kreps, 1990).  Should a firm engage in 
opportunism that were detected, it would be revealed in the marketplace and their reputation 
would suffer.  As with bonding, the primary difficulty of using reputation to reduce poaching is 
that the poaching needs to be credibly detected in order for reputation to be affected.  However,  
this condition is easier to satisfy for reputation than bonds – the client need only observe and 
publicize the misdeed, but does not need to be able to prove it to a third-party arbitrator or court.   
                                       
13 This could become an issue if a party ttempted to collect on a bond.  The discovery process of a court 
proceeding or arbitration can often require substantial revelation of information.  This may or may not be suitably 
protected by protective orders that limit the disclosure of information released in trial or arbitration proceedings. 
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5.1.6.  Relational Contracting 
 
Relational contracting is the use of loosely defined contractual agreements that set the rules for 
future negotiations, but allow terms for the agreement to be a process of ongoing negotiation.  
Relational contracting works best when there are substantial gains from trade and value from 
repeated interaction (in essence this is the equivalent of a reputational bond that s limited to a 
single relationship rather than the marketplace as a whole).  Relational contracts often lead to 
greater levels of information sharing than normal arms-length agreements and thus can enhance 
the opportunities for poaching.    However, this sharing may not be risky;  the ongoing 
negotiation process may make more likely that reuse of information is negotiated rather than 
through poaching.  The primary concern of using relational contracting to reduce poaching is that 
it hinges on observability of poaching – to the extent that poaching is unobservable in the short 
term, it will not damage the relationship and thus will not be an effective deterrent. 
 
5.1.7.  Auctions and Competitive Bidding 
 
A very common approach to contracting, especially wh n key factors (such as the productivity of 
the vendor or potential set of vendors) are unknown, is to utilize competitive bidding or auction 
processes.   In this mechanism, vendors are prequalified based on an established set of conditions, 
and then allowed to submit a proposal (or in some cases, simply a bid at a specified cost).  In 
some auctions, the party collecting the bids simply accepts the low cost bidder.  In others, the 
bidding initiates a round of further negotiations with the best bidders to obtain the best price-
quality tradeoff. 
 
Competitive bidding structures are likely to be very problematic in situations where poaching is 
possible.  To the extent that engaging in poaching can provide a revenue stream to offset cost, 
low bidders are disproportionately likely to be the ones that plan to engage in poaching.  
Moreover, it is already well known that bidders in common value auctions, where the actual (but 
not necessarily privately estimated) value of the good is the same for all bidders, often succumb to 
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“winners curse,” where the lowest bidder (the one whose bid was accepted) often wins because 
they were over optimistic about their cost.  A firm that has committed to a contract that cannot be 
profitable may have less opportunity cost (e.g. reputational damage) ssociated with engaging in 
poaching; that is, the reputational damage from poaching or other contractual abuse may still be 
less than the financial damage of competing the contract on its original terms.   In situations where 
poaching is a real possibility, there is very little possible advantage and potentially substantial 
disadvantage associated with relying on competitive bidding mechanisms. 
 
5.2.  New Approaches 
 
There is no standardized list of approaches for solving poaching problems.  Several common 
approaches described above that offer some relief were bonding, monitoring, exclusion of 
activities (e.g., non-c mpetition agreements), reputation, and relational contracting.  There are 
also several approaches that have been employd in the past that are relevant to solving poaching 
problems in specific settings.  This list is necessarily incomplete, but does give some suggestions 
of the types of remedies possible.  In general these rules divide into obscuring inf rmation from 
the recipient and enhancing observability or detection by the information provider.  We provide a 
few examples below. 
 
Embed information in systems.  Information can be partially withheld by embedding it in software 
or systems.  The vendor may have full access to the capabilities of the information but not the 
information itself.   
 
Encryption/Separation of Models and Data.  Confidential and critical data can be encrypted or 
kept separate from the information that is necessary to reveal to the vendor to perform a service 
or build a product.  One example is that a vendor can be utilized to build an expert system 
processing engine, while the business rules and models are only available to client personnel.
 
Modularity of Product.  An approach that has been effectivly utilized by the Coca-Cola company 
is to retain complete responsibility for formulating the syrup used to produce their soft drinks, 
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while contracting all the manufacturing and bottling capabi ties to franchisees and independent 
suppliers.  As long as the product cannot be easily reverse engineered and is never disclosed by 
the company (qualifying it for trade secret protection) this can be effective. 
 
Modularity of Process.  In most cases, poached information only has value if it can be combined 
with complementary assets.  To the extent that information is modular or the complementary 
physical assets are unique, a firm could distribute different components to different suppliers.  
This makes it less likely that a disparate base of suppliers could conspire to reconstruct the 
complete set of information (or information-asset combination) that has economic value. 
 
Seeding.  For large bodies of information that are likely to have resale value, “dummy” 
information could be included that may help reveal the presence of poaching.  For example, the 
insurance company in our example could seed the database with dummy accounts of desirable-
looking customers with the addresses of company offices.  Thus, if the mailing list were resold, 
marketing materials sent to the dummy customer would be strong evidence.  Map companies 
historically embedded small mistakes in their maps and atlases, for the same reason. 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have presented a theory of poaching, compared poaching to previous theories of 
contracting risk, examined the conditions under which poaching can occur, considered various 
remedies for poaching, and illustrated these ideas with case examples and a theoretical model 
which highlights the importance of complementary assets and product differentiation.  Our goal is 
to contribute additional understanding to the nature of various transaction risks faced by firms 
that outsource, understand how these risks occur, and present various remedies to solve the 
problems these risks create.  By doing so, we hope to improve academic understanding of the 
process of contracting for information services and other easy-to-app opriate technologies, and 
thus to enable practitioners to design better contractual agreements.  That is, our objectives 
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remain precisely those pursued by mainstream TCE research, but we do so in a domain that has 
previously received little study. 
 
Overall, our primary conclusion is that poaching is a distinct contractual risk that it is of 
increasing importance.  Moreover, we conclude that it is, at best, not well addressed by classical 
contracting mechanisms, and at worst exacerbated by remedies for various contractual problems 
suggested byTCE, Principal-Agent or Incomplete Contracts theory.  While we are able to identify 
a number of mechanisms that might perform better, the optimal contract structure when poaching 
is a potential difficulty is a promising area of future research from both a t eoretical and practical 
standpoint. 
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Appendix:  Derivation of the Model 
 
Costs to consumers are strictly increasing in distance from a producer.  Therefore, it is possible to 
derive the length of the line segment served by each producer (and therefore the demand quantity 
– see Tirole, 1988, p. 280) by locating the point where consumers are indifferent from purchasing 
between the two producers.  This occurs at a point (x% ) whe  cost to the consumer is equated:  
2 2
1 2 (1 )p tx p t x+ = + -% % .  Therefore:  2 11 1 2( , ; ) 2
p p t
D p p t x
t
- +
= =%  and 
1 2
2 1 2( , ; ) 1 2
p p t
D p p t x
t
- +
= - =% .  Firms simultaneously maximize profits by solving:  
1 2max ( ) ( , ; )i i i ip c D p p tp = - which yields the first order condition for each firm (i, facing firm j):  
2 0i j ic t p p+ + - = .  The second order conditions are trivially satisfied so this will yield a unique 
optimum.  Solving these two equations simultaneously yields the following optimal price:  
2
3
i j
i
c c
p t
+
= +  (Equation 2).  Plugging this price into the demand function yields Equation 3.  
To simplify the analysis, we assumed that the entire market was served.  This is the case as long 
as the reservation price exceeds the cost for the most distant customer (the indifferent customer 
between the two producers).  Without loss of generality, we focus on firm 1.  Therefore, the 
required condition is:  2 2 21 2 1 2 1 2 1 21 1
1 2 5
( ) ( )
2 6 3 4 2 6
c c c c c c c c
r tq p t t t t
t t
- + + -
> + = - + + = + + .  Since 
the indifference point cannot be greater than x=1 by definition, this bounds the last term by 2
1
( )
2
t .  
Therefore, we have: 1 2 1 2
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r t t c c
+
> + ³ + as appears in the text. 
